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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of 
the issues herein. (Set forth in the Addendum). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFAULT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR MISTAKE 
AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
In reading appellee Slingerland's Brief, one would be led to 
believe that the judicial system would be brought to its knees if 
Baum were allowed to have his day in court. In claiming that Baum 
"did not meet his burden of proof/' Slingerland ignores the plain 
language of the court's ruling and basis for denying Baum's Motion 
to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment which was that: 
All concerned were aware of the proceedings, 
or reasonably could have been with proper 
attention . . . (R. 0207) 
In other words, the court ruled that a Default will not be set 
aside if the defaulting party conceptually "could" have taken steps 
to prevent it. 
Appellant Baum respectfully submits that the court's ruling is 
in error in that it applies hindsight to what Baum "could" have 
done instead of examining Baum's actions which actually did take 
place. 
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In his Motion to Set Aside the Default, Baum informed the 
court that due to the totality of circumstances existing at the 
time the Default was entered his "inaction" constitutes excusable 
neglect. Baum was faced with the traumatic experience of being 
sued by his best friend who is now a quadriplegic. His insurance 
company had earlier denied coverage. He was young with no 
experience in the legal system and he was confused as to the state 
of affairs. Due to conversations with Slingerland's attorney who 
advised him he would seek coverage from the insurance company and 
a family attorney who advised him that his best option may be 
bankruptcy, Baum took no action during the time the Answer was due. 
Subsequently, Baum contacted his insurance carrier, informed them 
of the fact that a lawsuit had been filed, and defense counsel was 
retained for him and a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was 
filed. The court below did not consider these factors in its 
decision, but merely ruled that since Baum was or should have been 
aware of the proceedings, that the Default would not be set aside. 
Baum respectfully submits that such a ruling does not apply the 
correct standard of whether or not a Judgment by Default should be 
set aside under Rule 60(b) and that the court's ruling is, 
therefore, in error and an abuse of discretion. 
Further, in his Brief of Appellee, Slingerland ignores the 
fact that in his memorandum opposing the Motion to Set Aside 
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Default all arguments were made, not against Baum, but against 
USF&G, a non-party. In his Brief, Slingerland makes no response 
and provides no explanation to this court concerning the 
inappropriateness of such an argument made below and of the 
apparently successful "straw man" attack against USF&G. 
Baum respectfully submits that the court below further abused 
its discretion in failing to set aside the Default Judgment by 
relying on Slingerland's attack against USF&G as its basis for 
failing to set the Default aside. (R. 0217). In responding to 
Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, Slingerland never 
claimed he would be prejudiced if the Default were set aside, 
instead he filed a 13-page Memorandum arguing that "USF&G" had not 
met its burden as to why the Default should be set aside, that 
"USF&G/s" Motion to Set Aside the Default was untimely and that 
"USF&G" has failed to show that Baum had a meritorious defense. 
The court below wrongfully based its decision to deny Baum's Motion 
to Set Aside the Default on Slingerland#s arguments against USF&G. 
In summary, a Default Judgment was entered against Baum due to 
Baum's inexperience, emotional state, confusion, and circumstances 
which constitute mistake and excusable neglect. There was no 
evidence of prejudice should the Default be set aside. The court 
below refused to set the Default aside based on Slingerland#s 
arguments against "USF&G" and due to the fact that Baum "could" 
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have conceivably taken some action to prevent the Default which, of 
course, could be said on a theoretical basis of all Judgments by 
Default. As such, Baum respectfully submits that the court abused 
its discretion in failing to set the Default aside. 
POINT II 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY 
The Default Judgment in favor of Slingerland and against Baum 
was entered on June 17, 1992. The Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment was filed on September 11, 1992, within the required three 
months of Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In opposing 
Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default in the court below, 
Slingerland claimed that the Motion to Set Aside was untimely 
because it was filed more than 90 days after the Default 
"Certificate" was entered, which took place on May 18, 1992. 
However, Rule 60(b) refers to a "Judgment" and not a Default 
Certificate as the relevant time from which to measure the three 
months during which a Motion to Set Aside may be filed. 
For Slingerland to now, for the first time on appeal, argue 
that the Motion to Set Aside the Default was not filed within a 
"reasonable time," is not properly before the court and has no 
basis for fact or law. 
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Finally, the court below refused to set the Default Judgment 
aside, not for any reason of "timeliness," but for reasons as 
outlined in Point I above. 
POINT III 
BAUM HAS MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
In Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the Supreme 
stated: 
Usually it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b) 
motions to examine the merits of the claim 
decided by the default judgment. Robinson v. 
Myers
 r Utah 599 P.2d 513 (1979), Board of 
Education v. Cox. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963). 
Although the merits may not be at issue in a Motion to Set 
Aside a Default, Baum has a meritorious defense which he should be 
able to assert contrary to Slingerland/s assertions that the 
accident was solely the fault of Baum. 
Section 78-27-40 Utah Code Annotated states in relevant part: 
• • • The maximum amount for which a defendant 
may be liable to any person seeking recovery 
is that percentage or proportion of damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. . . . 
Slingerland's damages may be barred or reduced by a 
substantial degree, should a jury find that his injuries were 
caused by his own negligence or other fault. Baum and Slingerland 
were involved in a joint venture. Both agreed that Baum should 
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drive, although both were tired and sleepy and had been awake a 
substantial period of time. Slingerland did nothing to assist Baum 
in staying awake. Instead, Slingerland took off his seat belt and 
went to sleep. As he subsequently woke up, Slingerland exacerbated 
the dangerous situation when he yelled at Baum, seeing Baum had 
fallen asleep, apparently startling Baum, resulting in the over-
correcting and eventual rollover of the vehicle in which they were 
traveling. This accident and Slingerland's injuries did not occur 
solely due the fault of Baum. If Baum's actions rise to the level 
of actionable negligence, then so do Slingerland's. 
Baum should be given an opportunity to present his defense and 
have his day in court. 
POINT IV 
SLINGERLAND WILL NOT BE PREJUDICED 
IF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE 
In Westinahouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen Contractor. 
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), the court clearly stated: 
. . . Courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgment where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result 
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party. 
Substantial prejudice or injustice to Slingerland must be 
shown to be a basis for denial of a Motion to Set Aside the 
Default. No such showing was made. The court below at no time 
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considered the issue of prejudice or stated as a basis for refusing 
to set the Default aside that Slingerland would be substantially 
prejudiced. Most important, Slingerland at no time claimed he 
would be prejudiced. Slingerland now claims, for the first time on 
appeal, that should the Judgment be set aside, he would be 
prejudiced. To make this argument and present this claim for the 
first time on appeal is improper and should, therefore, be 
disregarded. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Board of Education. 797 
P.2d 412, 413; Olsen v. Par-Craia-Olsen. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358; 
and Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036, 
1039. 
Further, Slingerland, in his Appellee Brief, claims that the 
issue of prejudice did not arise because the court never found a 
prima facie case entitling Baum to relief from Judgment. This 
argument is also without merit. The issue of prejudice to 
Slingerland did not come up because Slingerland did not claim 
prejudice. According to Slingerland'& reasoning, if the court 
below had set the Default aside, Slingerland would then have filed 
a new and separate motion and memorandum claiming prejudice, thus 
having a second bite at the apple. 
The fact remains that in his memorandum opposing Baum's Motion 
to Set Aside the Default Judgment, Slingerland failed at any time 
to mention or claim prejudice should the Default be set aside. 
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Instead, Slingerland proceeded with various attacks against USF&G, 
upon which the court based its decision. 
Slingerland did not make a claim of prejudice to the court 
below, nor was there any showing or consideration of prejudice at 
the time the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was heard. 
It is improper to make a claim of prejudice for the first time now 
on appeal, and such a claim should be disregarded. 
Failing to set aside a Default Judgment where there is no 
showing of prejudice under circumstances as exist herein, 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Baum respectfully requests this court to find that 
the court below abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
Default Judgment entered against him based on the following: 
1. Baum was in a state of emotional distress and confused 
state of mind at the time the Default was entered against 
him. As a result of conversations with his family 
attorney and with Slingerland's attorney, due to the fact 
that his insurance company refused to provide coverage 
and due to the fact that he was being sued by his best 
friend, who was now a quadriplegic, Baum felt, for a time 
during which his Answer was due, that there was nothing 
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he could do. This was an honest mistake and constitutes 
excusable neglect as contemplated under Rule 60(b). 
2. Slingerland did not claim or show prejudice should the 
Default be set aside. 
3. The court's basis for refusing to set the Default aside 
was that Baum was aware or should have been aware of the 
proceedings in question. (R. 0207). By such a standard, 
no Default would ever be set aside, since in hindsight it 
can always be stated that the defaulted party could have 
done something. 
4. The court further improperly based its decision on the 
Memorandum of Authorities filed by Slingerland, which 
Memorandum exclusively attacked USF&G and not Baum. 
Slingerland#s "straw man" attack against USF&G was 
improper and the court's denying Baum's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment based on arguments against 
USF&G was an abuse of discretion. 
5. Slingerland's damages did not occur solely due to the 
negligence or other fault of Baum. Slingerland may be 
equally at fault or, in the alternative, his damages 
should be reduced by his proportionate share of fault. 
Accordingly, appellant Baum respectfully submits that this 
court find that the court below abused its discretion in refusing 
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to set aside the Default Judgment entered against Baum on June 17, 
1992. 
DATED this &T* day of May, 1993. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Heinzyzl. Mjahler 
Attorneyfpr Defendant/Appellant 
Douglas M. Baum 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
